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Protecting the most vulnerable in consumer 
credit transactions 
     
Introduction 
 
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (“UCCC”) commenced operation on 1 November 1996 under an 
inter-governmental agreement, and now operates in all States and Territories of Australia. Pursuant to 
section 6 of the UCCC, it applies to the provision of credit to a natural person where the credit is 
provided wholly or predominantly for personal, household or domestic purposes; where a charge is 
made for providing the credit; and where the credit is provided in the course of a business providing 
credit or as part of or incidental to any other business of the credit provider. The UCCC seeks to protect 
consumers in two key ways: through disclosure requirements and through what we refer to as ‘safety 
net provisions’ which operate in the event that a consumer’s circumstances change or disclosure and 
competition have not provided adequate consumer protection. 
 
In this article we will explore the limitations of these forms of consumer protection, particularly in the 
case of vulnerable, low income consumers, drawing on 30 qualitative interviews conducted in Victoria 
between December 2007 and February 2008 and reported on in November 2008 (Sheehan, Wilson and 
Howell 2008). Interviews were conducted by the Brotherhood of St Laurence. As an organisation 
which interacts with many people living on limited incomes, the Brotherhood of St Laurence is 
concerned about their access to appropriate mainstream finance. 
 
We define a ‘low income consumer’ to include people who are financially excluded from access to 
mainstream credit on the basis of income. Financial exclusion in the Australian context has been 
defined as: 
 
The lack of access by certain consumers to appropriate low cost, fair and safe financial 
products and services from mainstream providers (Chant Link and Associates 2004, p. 58). 
 
In Australia, where only 0.08% of the Australian adult population own no financial products, but where 
6% own only a transaction product and therefore no credit products (Chant Link and Associates 2004, 
p. 120), lack of access to safe and affordable short-term, small amount credit is central to the question 
of financial exclusion (Consumer Affairs Victoria 2006). Some definitions of low income Australians 
are likely to set the bar too low to include those who are financially excluded on the basis of income.  
For example, a single person with no dependants is regarded as a low income earner where he or she 
earns a gross annual income of no more than AUD$22,620, according to Australian government 
welfare agency, Centrelink (Centrelink 2008). The Australian Bureau of Statistics figures confirm that 
people at this income level experience the highest level of financial stress in the community and are 
likely to be unable to raise $2000 in a week for something important (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
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2007).  It is possible, however, that people earning above that amount would be excluded from 
mainstream credit primarily on income grounds, when their application is processed under a 
mainstream credit provider’s credit scoring model. Unfortunately credit scoring models are not made 
freely available by mainstream credit providers so it is difficult to verify this. Nevertheless, a low 
income consumer will be regarded for the purposes of this article as a person defined by government a 
low income earner or who is or would be denied access to mainstream credit on the basis of income 
alone. 
Those who were interviewed for the purpose of this research fall within our definition of low income 
Australian. They were predominantly renters of public housing, receiving income support payments 
and not in the workforce. 63% of them had had transactional accounts only (and therefore no credit 
products) prior to taking out the loan under discussion in this research. Of the 30 interviewees, 22 had 
recently signed a credit contract as participants of low interest, community loans programs, and 8 had 
recently obtained credit from a fringe lender, meaning that they had accessed high cost credit from 
outside the ‘mainstream’ credit market (see discussion in Consumer Affairs Victoria 2006).  
The research was qualitative in nature and given the sample size it is not possible to generalise that the 
views expressed are representative of all low income consumers, nor can the results be analysed 
statistically. However, this research method was chosen because it gave the opportunity to ‘understand 
the world as seen by the respondents’ (Patton 1990, p. 24). It provided a small number of information 
rich interviews which are at least indicative of the views and experiences of low income borrowers. 
The 22 community loans recipients took part in interviews which focused on their understanding of 
information disclosed in the contract (see discussion guide, annexure 1). They were also asked to 
reflect on the paperwork in general, their rights and responsibilities and the most important aspects of 
the contract, and were presented with a one-page summary of the contract and asked for their opinions 
on it (see short form personal loan contract, annexure 2).  
The 8 fringe credit recipients took part in interviews which focused on hypothetical unfair contract 
terms (see discussion guide, annexure 3). They were also asked for responses to extracts from a mock 
contract containing terms that consumer groups have considered unfair, in the sense of being 
unreasonably disadvantageous to the consumer (see mock contract, annexure 4) (Australian 
Consumers’ Association 2002; Consumer Affairs Victoria 2006; Consumers’ Federation of Australia 
2008). They were then asked who they would approach about problems with the lender, in order to 
elicit their understanding of their rights under the UCCC. 
Limitations of the research methodology which should be noted are firstly that some interviewees had 
existing or previous relationships with the Brotherhood of St Laurence which may have influenced 
their responses, although loans officers took no part in the interviews. To minimise this risk it was 
emphasised that the loans would proceed regardless of their comments and that there were no right or 
wrong answers. It was also stressed that their comments were confidential and would have no impact 
on future loan applications. Secondly, there was a risk that participants would overstate their 
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understanding of the credit contract to avoid feeling like a failure. This was overcome by extensive 
piloting of the interview discussion guides so that the interview would seem quite informal and 
participants would feel that any opinions would be accepted in a non-judgmental way. Thirdly, the 
discussion about low-income people’s propensity to sign contracts including unfair terms was 
hypothetical. There is likely to have been a bias towards people saying that they would not sign a 
contract with unfair terms but then behaving differently in a desperate situation. As a result, the 
research focused on interviewee’s opinions on clauses within the contract, rather than views as to 
whether they would proceed with the loan. The research also focused on participants’ understandings 
of their rights and inclination to pursue rights, for example through seeking legal advice or 
commencing court proceedings. Finally, this research focused on one component of the mandated 
disclosure under the UCCC, namely the pre-contractual statement required by section 14 which in most 
cases is comprised of the proposed contract document. This research did not examine other forms of 
disclosure required by the UCCC, including statements of account and other notices and warnings. 
In this article we will consider the literature on disclosure regulation and its effectiveness and then 
draw on the qualitative interview data to draw conclusions as to the effectiveness of disclosure as a 
means of protecting vulnerable, low income Australians. Qualitative interview data was analysed to 
ensure quotes were representative of the sample and findings were not dominated by any one 
participant. We will then consider the literature concerning the effectiveness of safety net provisions 
such as hardship provisions and an ability to re-open unjust transactions. Included in this will be a 
discussion on the effectiveness of consumer protections more generally which rely on consumers to 
initiate litigation, and the consequences of the lack of an unfair contract terms regime. Again, we will 
then draw on the qualitative interview data to assess the effectiveness of current measures in protecting 
vulnerable low income Australians. In our conclusion we will make four key recommendations for 
regulatory reform in Australia to better protect those consumers. 
 
Part One- Disclosure 
Disclosure under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
 
The key principle informing the UCCC is “truth in lending,” derived from the US Truth in Lending Act 
1968. The declared purpose of the Truth in Lending Act was to ensure the meaningful disclosure of 
credit terms so that consumers would be able to compare more readily the various credit terms 
available to them, and to avoid the uninformed use of credit (Kofele-Kale 1984, p. 120). The theory has 
been that ‘credit cost disclosure’ causing greater information in the hands of consumers, ‘necessarily 
leads to informed consumer choice in the credit market place’ (Kofele-Kale 1984, p. 117). 
 
The explanatory memorandum to the UCCC explained ‘truth in lending’ as a concept by which 
consumers can make informed choices between credit products taking into account the nature of the 
credit being offered and comparative costs between credit providers. Disclosure was regarded as 
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important to achieving this, and pursuant to sections 14 and 15 of the UCCC the disclosure of a range 
of information is required to be made to a borrower before a credit contract is entered into. Both the 
pre-contractual statement (often just a copy of the credit contract provided before the contract is 
entered into)  and the credit contract itself are required to set out such information as the amount of 
credit, annual percentage interest rates and how they will be calculated, repayments, whether interest 
and credit fees and charges can be changed, frequency of statements of account, enforcement expenses 
payable on breach, whether any commission is payable, whether there is any security being taken, and  
details of any security and insurance. Breach of section 15 is deemed to be a breach of a ‘key 
requirement’ under section 100, carrying with it the possibility of a civil penalty order of up to 
$500,000. Situating disclosure as a key requirement under the UCCC carrying with it the possibility of 
a heavy penalty for breach, demonstrates the central nature of disclosure in the UCCC as a consumer 
protection mechanism. This can be compared with penalties such as $11,000 for breach of advertising 
requirements under section 140, harassment under section 145 or canvassing of credit at home under 
section 146; or $5,500 for false or misleading representations under section 144. 
 
The problems with disclosure regulation 
 
As Cartwright notes, disclosure regulation is a ‘relatively ‘pro-market’ regulatory response because it 
facilitates the consumer’s making of an informed choice’ (Cartwright 2004, p. 62). It is said to perfect 
imperfect markets by addressing information asymmetries. With perfect information, consumers will 
be able to make ‘perfect’, rational choices thus enhancing the efficiency of the market. By ensuring the 
provision of information to consumers it is theorised that: 
 
…consumers can protect their own interest by selecting the goods or services closest to their 
own preferences. Harm will be reduced by ensuring goods and services are more likely to be 
in line with realistic consumer expectations based on reliable information (Howells 2005, p. 
355). 
 
The emphasis is very much on consumers being able to protect themselves, which might be seen as 
evidence of the phenomenon referred to by Ramsay as the ‘responsibilisation’ of the consumer: 
 
…where governments are investing heavily in projects to ensure that individuals become 
responsible consumers through the use of information, the development of financial 
capability, and financial literacy programs (Ramsay 2006, p. 13). 
 
One must ask whether it is realistic to expect all consumers to protect themselves and manage their 
own risks on the basis that they have been provided with relevant information. One major criticism of 
disclosure regulation is that it is based on an ‘unrealistic, rational actor model of borrower behaviour’ 
(Willis 2006, p. 741). 
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Much of the literature on disclosure regulation suggests that this form of regulation is likely to be of the 
least benefit to low income, vulnerable consumers. As long ago as 1976, Day wrote that: 
 
Information disclosure requirements have been aptly described as protection for the middle 
class. Low income buyers, who have the greatest need for protection or assistance in making 
more informed choices, are more likely to lack the characteristics that will allow them to take 
advantage of the information (Day 1976, p. 49). 
 
Where low income consumers are in desperate need of credit and regard themselves as having little 
choice in terms of credit products available to them, they are unlikely to take any disclosed information 
into account in entering into a credit contract. As Howells has noted: 
 
Information is only useful if it can be acted upon. The poor may rationally decide not to make 
use of information, if they feel no alternatives will be available to them (Howells 2005, p. 
357). 
 
A study conducted in Australia in 1999 supports a view that people on low incomes will not benefit 
from the provision of information to them when entering into a credit contract, because of their lack of 
choice. It was reported that: 
 
Most low income participants stated that their main priority when seeking credit is finding out 
the credit providers who were prepared to provide them credit. Many said they were unable to 
get credit from most places…Respondents on low incomes reported that their choice of lender 
was determined by the lender who was prepared to lend them the money…For some they had 
no choice but to borrow from a lender who they knew charged high interest rates. Thus choice 
of lender tended to be determined by a lack of bargaining power rather than ignorance of what 
loans were on offer (Malbon 1999, p. 78). 
 
Howells also refers to disclosure as a ‘middle class tool’ in that: 
 
Those who take advantage of information are likely to be the more affluent, well-educated 
middle-class consumers. Evidence from studies of consumer credit disclosure rules suggests 
that it is better-off consumers who tend to make use of information (Howells 2005, p. 357). 
 
   
As a result there is an argument that reliance on disclosure regulation can exacerbate social inequity. 
Wilhelmsson argues that: 
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Information measures are neutral as to their recipients, which in practice means an advantage 
for the consumers who are well-equipped to use the information. In this sense, therefore, 
measures based on the information paradigm may reproduce and even strengthen existing 
social injustice (Wilhelmsson 1997, p. 224). 
 
The complexity and volume of information disclosed is also open to criticism. It has been found that 
consumers have a limited ability to understand and process information.  
 
The human mind handles data by breaking it down into manageable chunks. It has been 
estimated that roughly seven chunks of information is the most the human mind can handle at 
any one time (Howells 2005, p. 360). 
 
While comprehension levels may be higher among middle class consumers, the inability to cope with 
large amounts of information might render disclosure a somewhat ineffective regulatory tool even in 
terms of protecting middle class consumers. The 1999 Australian study referred to above involved a 
national telephone poll of 1600 consumers who had borrowed under the UCCC, as well as 6 focus 
groups conduced in Melbourne and Brisbane. Those polled and interviewed came from a range of 
socio-economic backgrounds and comprehension levels were reportedly good overall. There were 
shown to be some overall benefits experienced by consumers in receiving information about credit 
products, but there were a number of complaints about such things as complexity and repetitiveness of 
the information provided.  (Malbon 1999) The telephone poll revealed that 88% of those entering a 
personal loan contract read the pre-contractual loan information before signing and 51% said that the 
information was helpful in that it clarified the terms of the loan into which they were entering. (Malbon 
1999, pp. 67 & 68) The focus group results painted a less positive picture.  
 
Whilst some participants carefully read the information provided to them, a number found it 
difficult to use. The complaints about the information included that it was “beyond 
comprehension”, “needs to be simpler, in layman’s terms”, “is repetitive and boring”. Several 
participants made the point that they had to rely on the bank manager or service officer to 
explain the loan terms, and that they had to accept their explanation of trust. “I only took in 
half of what they were saying. I was going to sign anyway, what difference does it make?” 
(Malbon 1999, p.71)   
 
Other research conducted at the University of Queensland in 2005 used four different types of 
contracts, including a consumer credit contract. 215 participants, who were predominantly university 
students, with an average age of 20, presumably literate and intelligent and therefore giving rise to an 
“elite bias” in the study, were given the contracts to read. When questioned on their understanding of 
the content of the contracts, only 16 of the 215 participants correctly answered the question, “what is 
the loan costing you?” This lack of comprehension could, of course, be attributable in part to the fact 
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that these participants were not actually entering into credit contracts and therefore did not have a 
strong motivation to try to understand them. (O’Shea and Finn, 2005) 
 
Focus group research conducted by the National Consumer Council in the U.K. in 2007 highlighted the 
problems associated with ‘too much information’ (Better Regulation Executive and National Consumer 
Council 2007). The research involved 12 qualitative focus groups with consumers, ‘discussing real 
examples of regulated information and their reactions to them’ (Better Regulation Executive and 
National Consumer Council 2007, p. 7). These ‘real examples’ included a consumer credit agreement 
which took the focus group participants 55 minutes to read. It was reported that: 
 
Consumers did not find the information provided helpful. Some of the more vulnerable groups 
we spoke to found overly complex information not only difficult but also humiliating. Across 
society our research found a desire for simple, succinct information (Better Regulation 
Executive and National Consumer Council 2007, p. 7). 
 
The very name given by the National Consumer Council to its report (“Warning: Too Much 
Information Can Harm”) as well as the findings reported within it, confirm the problem of ‘information 
overload’, in that ‘overwhelmed by too much information, normal consumer reaction is to ignore the 
disclosures entirely’ (Kofele-Kale 1984, p.128). 
 
There is also the crucial consideration of borrowers’ literacy levels. The Deputy Chairman of the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission has noted that ‘46 per cent of Australians can’t read 
well enough to understand financial disclosure documents’ (Cooper 2008, p. 2). 
 
What our research shows: Does disclosure help consumers?  
 
Understanding important terms 
 
The comments made by interviewees generally contradicted the fundamental assumption of the UCCC 
that disclosure of information assists borrowers in making an informed choice about signing a credit 
contract. The interviewees felt overwhelmed by the length of the contracts and the language used, 
particularly given that many of the participants had not finished school and had a limited understanding 
of the language used in contracts. 
 
Because I’m illiterate with certain things, but I battle- if I come to a word what I don’t 
understand I skip it, and I have to keep going to the next one. And half the time I skip half the 
letter because I can’t understand what it’s trying to say. 
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They’ve got a hell of a lot of pages here. There’s about maybe 20 pages here, maybe more. 
I’m not sure why they have such a big, thick paper. But I think the [financial institution] could 
make it a little bit more briefer than that for people. 
 
What they need to do is they need to go over the contract again and maybe word it better for 
people who are not [educated]- see I’ve only done Year 10, and I think that’s my failing, 
where I’ve gone and signed the contract and I couldn’t understand a lot of what was being 
said. It blurred: I see all these words…I think they need to go back and re-word it and maybe 
put it in more plainer English. 
 
They should keep it just basic and one or two pages with simple words on it than something 
really complicated that you can’t read…Why send out a contract for you to sign and end up 
having pages and pages of it to deal with? I think more it’s to cover their backside really…But 
it’s your risk. 
 
The interviewees did understand their obligation to repay the loan, although that understanding was 
derived not from the contract but rather from their own sense of an unwritten contract along the lines of 
“I promise not to default”. 
 
I think my main responsibility is to make sure- which I do every fortnight- that the money’s in 
the bank...Every time I get my pension I make sure that I leave that money there for the 
[financial institution] because it makes me feel good and it makes me feel responsible as a 
person. 
 
Interviewees tended to understand the amount of their fortnightly repayment, but not how that related 
to the interest rate or how interest was calculated.  
 
I’m not quite sure about the interest- but I’m paying $46 a fortnight out of my disability 
pension. 
 
For those borrowing from fringe lenders, most knew that the charges were high and were very clear on 
the tangible impact of these repayments on their budget. 
 
 You end up paying about $190 something on a $100 loan. That is a lot of money. 
 
While this participant was clear that she was paying a total of $90 in interest, she later explained that 
she did not understand how this was represented as an interest rate. 
 
I don’t know about interest rates…Because I’ve never had anything to do with interest rates 
and calculating interest and all that. Their interest rate is absolutely shocking. 
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In addition to not understanding interest rate calculations, interviewees did not understand the 
consequences of not repaying the loan, often operating under misconceptions that the lender had far 
more rights than it in fact did. One misconception was that if a borrower defaulted, the lender could 
automatically pursue their next of kin, even in the absence of any contractual liability on the part of the 
next of kin, for example through a guarantee having been signed. 
 
[The financial institution] would make an application for the next of kin or something like 
that, for the default. I don’t know really myself. 
 
There was also a misconception that the lender could seize the borrower’s property, notwithstanding 
the absence of any security having been taken at law. 
 
If we fall behind, they’ve got the right to come and repossess or take legal action against 
you…They’ve got all the rights to come out and repossess some of your furniture. 
 
These misconceptions suggest that consumers are vulnerable to the risk that a lender could assert such 
rights without challenge by the borrower. 
 
Interestingly, when presented with the short form one page contract (see annexure 2) some 
interviewees did grasp the meaning of some important terms and responded to them, for example the  
clause accelerating the obligation to repay the loan in full in the event of default. 
 
If you fail to make a payment- Oh my god! This is not a contract, this is signing your life 
over…No thank you! 
 
This suggests that the provision of a shorter form contract with only the most essential terms outlined, 
may make disclosure requirements more effective, even for low income or otherwise vulnerable 
consumers.  
Impact of a lack of choice 
 
The primary reason for low income interviewees signing contracts without fully understanding them 
was that they realised their options were limited. Research by the Brotherhood of St Laurence 
suggested many low income people do not have a network of family and friends to help them in 
difficult times. Even if they do have a network of family and friends, these people are often on low 
incomes themselves and only have a limited capacity to assist. This research also indicated that many 
low income people saw there was more dignity and convenience in obtaining a loan rather than going 
without, going to an opportunity shop or obtaining emergency relief. Although recipients of a 
government payment are able to obtain one $500 advance each year, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
many re-apply for their advance as soon as they are eligible, so it is less likely to be available when 
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unexpected expenses arise. (Scutella and Sheehan, 2006)  Those who borrowed from fringe lenders felt 
desperate for money and realised that their choice was constrained by the realities of the market for 
credit. The contract seemed less relevant for those borrowers as there were no alternatives if they 
disagreed with the contractual terms and conditions. 
 
I’ve got a lot of reservations with the loan, and I’ve explored other options, but the pension 
doesn’t count as an income [to banks] so we’re stuck in the mud-hole at the moment. 
 
Interviewees understood that given their desperation for credit, they were left with no choice but to 
accept onerous conditions. 
 
I felt I was being railroaded, but I was desperate for a car- I was a single woman, they could 
see the desperation in my eyes as soon as I walked into that car lot. 
 
Interviewees also expressed a degree of powerlessness in their dealings with the lender.  
 
I didn’t really understand much of it…It was very quick. He just said, ‘Sign”, so I signed and 
that was it. He didn’t explain anything, nothing. 
 
I’ve signed, I have to take it, I have to cop it, there’s no problem- but what can I do? I just 
have to try to pay it and do whatever’s got to be done. 
 
The interviews demonstrated the particular limitations of disclosure where borrowers felt that they had 
no choice in accessing credit. It was very much a case of accessing credit from wherever you could, on 
whatever terms were offered. 
 
Part Two- Safety net provisions 
   
Although disclosure regulation is a primary focus of the UCCC, the Code also includes a number of 
provisions that focus on issues other than disclosure. In this paper, we focus on the provisions of the 
UCCC that give consumers the opportunity to vary a credit contract on the grounds of hardship 
(sections 66 and 68), to challenge a contract on the grounds that it is unjust (sections 70 and 71), and to 
dispute certain fees and charges in interest rates on the grounds that they are unconscionable (section 
72). These provisions give additional consumer protections where consumers are disadvantaged, 
despite disclosure and/or a competitive market; or where consumers’ financial or other circumstances 
change after a credit contract is entered into, such that the original obligations become impossible to 
meet. We have therefore characterised these provisions as ‘safety net’ provisions. 
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While these safety net provisions are generally available to all consumers, it is often assumed that these 
safety net provisions will be of most assistance to consumers who are on low incomes or otherwise 
disadvantaged.  
 
In relation to the hardship provisions, this assumption is manifest in the fact that the provisions are only 
available where the loan is below a specified amount (calculated by reference to average home prices 
in New South Wales, and changing over time). However, as we discuss below, the practical barriers to 
accessing these provisions may be much higher for low income consumers than other consumers.  
 
Despite the existence of these provisions for a number of years, and the existence of similar provisions 
in other jurisdictions (for example, in the New Zealand Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 
2003, and the UK Consumer Credit Act 2006), there appears to have been limited research on the 
effectiveness of these provisions for consumers generally, and for low income consumers in particular. 
This contrasts with greater levels of research on the effectiveness of disclosure regulation. To the 
extent that there is such discussion of ‘safety net’ provisions, it is largely in the nature of policy 
research and commentary, released by advocates and/or government agencies, rather than academic 
literature or extensive empirical work. 
 
The problems with the safety net provisions  
 
The importance of a competitive consumer credit market is emphasised in the explanatory material for 
the UCCC, and this is facilitated by information disclosure. However, the policy of the legislation is 
also to ‘to provide significant redress mechanisms for borrowers in the event that credit providers fail 
to comply with the legislation’ (KPMG Consulting 2000, p. 69). 
 
In their review of the objectives of the UCCC, KMPG Consulting observed: 
 
Even if prices are generally efficient, there still exists the opportunity for unscrupulous credit 
providers to take advantage of some debtors. Hence, it is appropriate to provide redress 
mechanisms to deter this type of activity (KPMG Consulting 2000, p. 71). 
 
In contrast with disclosure regulation, the safety net provisions cannot easily be characterised as a ‘pro-
market’ regulatory approach. Instead, they are more accurately characterised as, in Sylvan’s 
classification, ‘rules to protect consumers from inappropriate behaviour of traders’ (Sylvan 2004, p. 
194). The existence of these provisions acknowledges that, even in competitive markets, consumers 
can be subject to practices or transactions that are considered unacceptable by the community.  
 
Cartwright describes provisions that allow consumers to take action on the basis of unfairness as ‘open-
texture rules’ (Cartwright 2004, p. 152). These rules allow the courts to consider a wide variety of 
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factors before deciding whether the terms, transaction, or conduct offends the legal standard 
(Cartwright 2004, p. 169). This description applies equally to provisions to provide a remedy for 
conduct or transactions that are unjust or unconscionable, as in the UCCC. 
 
Given their ‘open-texture’ nature, the safety net provisions in the UCCC are not necessarily consistent 
with commercial and contractual certainty. They provide grounds for vitiating a contract that, on its 
face, appears to have been voluntarily entered into by both parties. In light of this, when considering 
the public interest as one of the factors in a decision under the open-texture rules in the UCCC and 
other legislation, the courts often ‘consider the relevance of the public interest that 
parties should generally be kept to agreements entered between them’ (Baltic Shipping Company v 
Dillon “Mikhail Lermontov”).1  
  
From a consumer perspective, the effectiveness of the safety net provisions has been criticised by 
reference to both the scope of the provisions, and the requirement that consumers must initiate action in 
order to activate the protection offered by the provisions. This last issue has particular import for 
vulnerable low income consumers. Although they are linked, we will outline some of the key criticisms 
on the scope of the individual provisions first, and then discuss the generally applicable criticism in 
relation to enforcement. 
 
The scope and framing of the provisions 
 
Section 66(1) of the UCCC permits a debtor to apply to the credit provider for a change to a credit 
contract if the debtor is ‘unable reasonably, because of illness, unemployment or other reasonable 
cause, to meet the debtor’s obligations under a credit contract’. Section 66(2) sets out the types of 
changes that can be made (essentially extending the term of the contract and/or postponing payments 
for a specified period). If a credit provider refuses to make the requested change, the debtor can apply 
to a Court to change the terms of the credit contract under section 68. 
 
Originally these provisions could not be used for credit transactions of more than $125,000. However, 
in 2004, the threshold was amended, and it now floats by reference to the average home loan in New 
South Wales ($312,950 at 8 October 2008). The possibility that this threshold might still operate as a 
barrier for some low and middle income households is perhaps moderated by hardship provisions in 
some industry codes that do not have a monetary limit (eg, Code of Banking Practice 2004, clause 
25.1). However, it is not entirely clear that there is a sound policy reason for excluding any UCCC 
regulated transaction from the hardship provisions. Early concerns that the criteria for permitting a 
variation were too narrow appear to have been allayed by a recent decision of the NSW Supreme 
Court2 that the phrase ‘other reasonable cause’ should be read widely, in accordance with its ordinary 
                                                 
1 (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 at 20. 
2 Permanent Custodians Ltd v Upston [2007] NSWSC 223; BC200701913. 
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meaning, and there is no reason to limit the scope of the phrase by reference to the preceding words of 
‘illness’ and ‘unemployment’ (Chun 2007, p. 138). 
 
Other criticisms of s 66 remain, including the uncertainty of its application in relation to continuing 
credit contracts, the limited nature of variations available, and the failure to impose an obligation or 
timeframe on credit providers to respond to a hardship request, are still applicable (Niven and Gough 
2004, pp 27-28; Tennant 2006, p. 11).  
 
Section 70 of the UCCC gives the court, on the application of a debtor, mortgagor, or guarantor, the 
power to re-open a transaction that gave rise to an unjust contract, mortgage or guarantee. Section 
70(2) provides a list of factors that the court can take into account in determining whether a contract 
term is unjust, and also directs the court to consider the public interest and all of the circumstances in 
the case. Section 71 details the orders that the court can make if it reopens a transaction; these include 
orders setting aside or revising or altering a contract, and orders relieving the debtor and any guarantor 
of any amounts not reasonably payable.  
 
The primary criticism of s 70 relates to the broad nature of the provision, where the provision of a list 
of factors that can be taken into account is said to create uncertainty for both consumers and 
businesses. For example, Carlin (in relation to similar provision in the Contracts Review Act) notes: 
 
While a list of indicia is provided by the Act, no instruction is provided in relation to the 
weighting of these factors by courts when reaching decisions as to injustice. This means that 
decision in which a contract is found to be unjust may have very little precedential value 
because they reflect one court’s predilections at a particular point in time rather than the result 
of a standardised process of consideration (Carlin 2001, pp 136-137). 
 
Critics have also suggested that s 70 fails, in application, to provide relief for substantive injustice in 
the absence of procedural irregularities (Howell 2006, p. 463; Niven and Gough 2004, p. 25). An 
emphasis on procedural injustice, rather than substantive injustice, necessitates an examination of 
individual circumstances, and thus also reduces the potential for the development of precedent and 
widespread change in business practice.  
 
Other criticisms are that s 70 is reactive, rather than proactive, and does not provide an effective 
remedy for consumer credit overcommitment, despite the fact that s 70(2)(l) specifically directs the 
court’s attention to the extent to which the consumer’s ability to repay was assessed by the credit 
provider.  
 
This last issue has a particularly impact on low income consumers. Niven and Gough refer to cases 
where irresponsible lending and overcommitment has occurred, leading to a declaration that the 
transaction was unjust. However, the debtor received no real or practical relief because the courts have 
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accepted the principle that, even for an unjust transaction, the debtor must ‘bring to account the benefit 
received’, and must repay the principal sum borrowed (Niven and Gough 2004, p. 24). 
 
Section 72 provides that, on the application of a debtor or guarantor, the court can annul or reduce 
unconscionable establishment, early termination, and prepayment fees, and unconscionable changes in 
interest rates. In determining whether a fee is unconscionable, reference can be made to the credit 
provider’s reasonable costs or expected losses (sections 72(3) and 72(4)).  
 
Section 72 appears to have had little impact on the size of fees in the credit market, with a review of 
establishment fees over a five year period showing increases greater than would be expected by 
reference to reasonable establishment costs (Niven and Gough 2004, p. 18). Providing a creditor’s 
reasonable costs is also likely to be very difficult in practice, and the effect of the provision can be 
circumvented through payment of excessive commissions and fees to third parties (Niven and Gough 
2004, pp18-19). In addition, even if a fee exceeds reasonable costs or expected losses, it may not be 
regarded as unconscionable. 3 
 
The above discussion highlights some of the key criticisms of the scope and application of the safety 
net provisions in the UCCC. To a large degree, some or all of the criticisms could be addressed by 
amendments to the legislation and/or more litigation to confirm the boundaries of the provisions. 
However, the effectiveness of safety net provisions also needs to be judged by reference to 
enforcement issues. Even if the limitations to the scope of the safety net provisions are addressed, the 
effectiveness of the provisions will be limited if the protections cannot be accessed or enforced in 
practice. 
 
Impediments to using the safety net provisions  
 
The effectiveness or otherwise of these safety net provisions in the UCCC must be judged by 
examining enforcement and remedies. As noted above, the provisions in relation to unjust contracts, 
unconscionable fees, and hardship variations require the affected consumer to institute legal action to 
take advantage of the rights and protections offered. Thus, for consumers to take advantage of the 
safety net provisions, they must (i) be aware of the options and (ii) have the necessary financial and 
personal resources to institute and maintain legal proceedings. However, for low income consumers, 
there is significant evidence to suggest that both the requisite knowledge and resources are often 
absent.  
 
Overall, there is relatively little use made of the safety provisions in formal legal proceedings (eg, 
Consumer Affairs Victoria 2006, p. 290; Lanyon 2004, p. 35). Consumer Affairs Victoria notes that the 
                                                 
3 See Director of Consumer Affairs v City Finance Loans [2005] VCAT 1989 (30 September 2005), 
para 31-32. 
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lack of litigation ‘is likely to have increased consumer detriment, because consumers do not pursue 
their rights, or the results of legal cases cannot be used to encourage compliance’ (Consumer Affairs 
Victoria 2006, p. 289). If cases are settled, either informally, or with the assistance of a dispute 
resolution scheme, the potential for systemic change is minimised. Niven and Gough note that this 
problem is particularly highlighted by the case of excessive or blackmail securities (securities taken 
over low value household goods). They explain: 
 
Each and every one of those transaction is arguably unjust, yet any attempt to curtail such 
practices is easily circumvented by the practical limitations imposed by s. 70 – only so many 
consumers are likely to seek assistance or take action on their own account, and in most cases, 
it will be economically beneficial to the credit provider to resolve each dispute as it arises, 
rather than to alter those practices (Niven and Gough 2004, p. 25). 
 
One clear barrier to litigation is a financial one. For many consumer disputes, the costs of litigating 
would outweigh any potential benefit from successful action. In some states and territories, rights under 
the UCCC can be exercised in a tribunal (eg Consumer Claims Tribunal in NSW), which has relaxed 
rules of evidence, discourages legal representation, and has lower filing fees. However, in other 
jurisdictions (eg Queensland), rights must be pursued through the court system. Even in those 
jurisdictions with a credit tribunal, consumer applications are still relatively low, and it has been 
suggested that a legalistic approach by the tribunals effectively requires consumers to have legal 
representation and thus increases the cost and formality (Consumer Affairs Victoria 2006, p. 290). 
 
The difficulties and costs of legal action are likely to be most prohibitive for consumers on low-
incomes. For instance, a UK study demonstrated that low-income consumers are unlikely to take legal 
action in relation to a loan, given the cost, a sense of powerlessness, and a fear of bitter disputes (Genn 
1999, p. 101). A more recent NSW study of responses to legal problems found that, among a range of 
civil, criminal and family problems, credit problems were the least likely to result in legal action being 
taken by disadvantaged consumers (Coumarelos, Wei and Zhou 2006, p. 99).4 
 
A further initiative to increase access to justice for consumer disputes, has been the growth of industry-
based dispute resolution schemes, including the Financial Ombudsman Service (‘FOS’), formed in 
2008 from a merger of the three largest dispute resolution schemes. Access to these schemes is free to 
the consumer, and in making a determination, the Ombudsman must take into account the law, industry 
codes, good industry practice, and fairness in all the circumstances (Financial Ombudsman Service, 
Banking and Finance Terms of Reference, clause 7.1).  
 
Disputes raising questions of unjust transactions, or unconscionable fees or interest can be, and are, 
considered, and adjudicated on by the FOS. However the FOS has ruled that its terms of reference do 
not allow it to make a variation under sections 66 or 68 of the UCCC. If a credit provider has refused to 
                                                 
4 Note, however, that the sample size for credit problems was 26. 
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grant a variation, the role of the FOS will be limited to considering whether the credit provider’s 
process for considering the variation request was appropriate (FOS 2005, p.7). In addition, there is 
currently no compulsion for credit providers to join a dispute resolution scheme. Low income 
consumers are more likely to borrow from non-mainstream lenders, and very few of these lenders have 
chosen to join a disputes scheme, leaving their customers to pursue disputes through the court system. 
 
Financial issues are not the only constraints facing consumers who are contemplating use of the safety 
net provisions. Consumers seeking to challenge the conduct of a credit provider will often need a high 
level of persistence and assertiveness to negotiate the process. In the UK, Moorhead and Robinson 
have observed that, for vulnerable consumers in particular, dealing with the issues causes stress, 
‘leaving clients with little energy for solving their problems, and that ‘clients coping with years of 
social exclusion … are often ill-equipped to deal with complex bureaucracies or hostile opponents 
(Moorhead and Robinson 2006, pp ii-iii).Referral fatigue can also be a major disincentive for 
consumers who are trying to seek assistance (Moorhead  and Robinson 2006, p.2). With specific 
reference to credit and debt issues, both Kempson and Whyley in the UK (1999, p.32), and Anae and 
Coxon in New Zealand (2007, p.106) discuss how consumers who already have limited access to credit 
may be reluctant to question a credit provider or complain about loan conditions for fear of restricting 
their borrowing options in the present or in the future. For low income consumers, embarrassment (that 
they have got themselves into this predicament) can also be a factor in not pursuing rights (eg Anae and 
Coxon 2007, p.70). 
 
Finally, research suggests that, for low income consumers in particular, having an adviser to facilitate 
their access to consumer protection remedies is vital. Studies in New Zealand and Australia have 
reported that negotiations with credit providers (under a formal hardship proposal or otherwise) are 
more likely to be successful, and taken more seriously by the creditor, when they are conducted by a 
financial counsellor or other adviser on the consumer’s behalf, rather than the negotiations being 
conducted by the consumer on their own (eg Anae and Coxon 2007, p.35; Schetzer 2007, pp 39, 42).  
 
These findings suggest that much more needs to be done to ensure that the rights under the UCCC are 
of practical assistance to low income consumers. 
 
What our study shows: Do consumers use the safety net 
provisions? 
 
In addition to the financial and personal resources needed to take action based on safety net provisions, 
low income consumers also need to be aware of their rights, or at least be able to identify that 
something is not fair, and then to have access to advice or resources to assess whether a remedy is 
available, and to pursue those rights. However, a number of studies have suggested that low income 
and vulnerable consumers often lack knowledge of consumer protection provisions and/or where to 
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turn for redress or assistance (eg Anae and Coxon 2007, p. 17; Kempson and Whyley 1999, p. 31; 
Schetzer 2007, p. 51). The results of our qualitative research are consistent with these findings. 
 
 
General understanding of consumer rights 
 
For example, when asked about their rights as consumers, most participants were only able to focus on 
the lenders’ expectations. Many confused the concepts of rights and responsibilities. For instance, one 
woman commented that she had the right ‘to do the right thing, to pay them’.  
 
Some people realised they had rights in relation to privacy legislation but seemed unsure of the 
specifics: 
 
Probably privacy, something like that. Privacy. And what else? I don’t know other things.  
 
Some people repeated what was in the contract, without seeming to understand what it meant in 
relation to their rights: 
 
I’ll be honest with you, I haven’t gone right through it as yet … [The financial institution] is 
bound by the code of practice for providing a service to you.  
 
Many borrowers from fringe lenders realised that they had grasped at anything offered and as a result 
felt that the lender had more rights:  
 
[I borrowed from a fringe lender] because I gambled it. I’m a gambler and sometimes it gets 
me into a real lot of trouble…. My rights and [the fringe lenders’] rights - it’s all [the fringe 
lenders] rights, nothing to do with my rights.  
 
Many assumed that they would forfeit their rights if they defaulted, but seemed confident that would 
not happen. They did not consider the possibility of a crisis. 
 
I don’t necessarily read the contracts, but I know I’m going to make the payments so I don’t 
worry about the consequences because I’m going to make sure I don’t default … If you don’t 
default you will be protected.  
 
Overall, low-income participants did not understand, or even know of, their rights under the UCCC or 
the ramifications of not repaying a loan. 
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Understanding of rights in the event of hardship 
 
In addition to being asked about their rights as consumers, participants were asked whom they would 
approach to discuss a payment problem.  
 
Some suggested they would approach legal aid or local community legal centres:  
 
I guess I’d have to call Legal Aid … And then if there was no other hope I guess I’d just have 
to try and pay it.  
 
Others suggested friends or family members. This suggests there is the risk of inaccurate advice if 
people rely too heavily on family and friends.  
 
Participants were also asked to reflect on any legal rights they might have in the event of hardship. No-
one mentioned that a court could vary a contract, or re-open a contract on the borrower’s application, 
suggesting that many low-income people do not understand their rights. Most suggested that they 
would approach the lender, however many considered that they had limited bargaining power: 
 
You go to a solicitor, the solicitor will fight for you. But you are not definitely going to win.  
 
Most intuitively felt that speaking to the lender was the right approach: 
 
I guess it would be the manager there, but I guess if they’ve got this kind of set up then you’re 
really not supported anyway, are you, they just do whatever they want. So I don’t know.  
 
Overall, people’s limited networks for advice on legal contracts made it difficult for them to understand 
their rights.  
 
 
Recognising potentially unfair terms 
 
The research also sought to understand whether low income consumers might identify, and be likely to 
challenge, a potentially unfair situation, in particular, an unfair term in a credit contract.  
 
Research participants were therefore presented with a one-page summary of the contract (for bank and 
credit cooperative borrowers) or a mock unfair contract (fringe lending borrowers). These documents 
included a number of clauses that have been identified as unfair by consumer advocates. One such 
clause was an ‘acceleration’ clause: ‘If you fail to make a payment when it falls due, the lender will 
give you 30 days to pay and will then be entitled to demand repayment of the full loan amount’. While 
this is a standard term of credit contracts, it does not make clear borrowers’ rights under section 84 
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UCCC to be served with a notice of default, with a certain period to remedy the default before the 
acceleration clause can operate.  
 
Most participants reflected that the clause made them feel powerless, afraid and vulnerable. A customer 
of a fringe lender was aware that she had given the lender this right but felt so desperate to obtain the 
money that she had signed anyway: 
 
I remember them saying that if I don’t pay, if you miss one payment, well they can demand 
that you pay the whole lot out… [I would have felt] terrified. Petrified that I’m going to get a 
letter or a phone call saying, ‘Excuse me, but you defaulted on the loan and we want the 
money straight away.’  
 
A minority of participants felt the acceleration clause was reasonable because they were so committed 
to repaying and confident they would not end up in a position of default: 
 
I think that’s fair, I think that’s very fair . The [financial institution] gives you [the loan] 
because they expect people to do the right thing and give them back their money. Because if 
you remember, [it’s] the [financial institution’s] money, it’s not mine.  
 
It is also standard for the credit provider to have the power to vary the terms of the contract. The 
summary contract and mock unfair contract included the term: ‘The terms of this loan may be varied by 
the lender without your consent.’ This is subject to the rights of borrowers under sections 59, 60 and 63 
of the UCCC to receive notice before some types of changes are made. Interviewees were unaware of 
the right to seek a variation of the contract, and were certainly unaware of any rights to be given notice 
of the change.  
 
Most participants commented on the power imbalance inherent in the lender’s ability to make changes 
without their consent:  
 
How can you make a contract … making it legal to change anything we like within the 
contract? Is that a contract? That’s double-dutch. The reason for a contract is so it can’t be 
changed … That’s like fingers behind your back and crossing them, telling lies. It’s crazy … 
Well why can’t I change it then? Why doesn’t it say either party, for instance? That would be 
fair; I’m all right with that. 
 
Although increased repayments would have been difficult to manage, another woman had resigned 
herself to being powerless. She had borrowed from a fringe lender because she had limited options. She 
accepted this as her lot in life: 
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That would be a problem. During a loan in particular—like if you’re actually paying it off at 
the time and all of a sudden it went bang, up a bit higher from what it was the previous week 
for example: it’d be a shock wouldn’t it? … I suppose you have less options, it’s less options 
obviously because your income is low … I suppose I do know that with these kinds of loans, 
because they are easy, you probably are going to have stuff like this in your contract.  
 
Only one man (another community loan borrower) felt confident to challenge the lender. Across all 
aspects of his life, this man was determined that no-one would ‘get the better’ of him. This was an 
attitude, not a capacity which could easily develop through consumer protections: 
 
Well they’d have to consult me first and say they want to alter the contract … if some unusual 
circumstances cropped up and they said they were going to have to change this—something 
reasonable—I’d just say fair enough. But if they put something outrageous out I’d say forget 
it, I just wouldn’t pay it, you know  ….  
 
In contrast to most participants, one woman very carefully read the contract and understood it. To her, 
the contract was sufficiently threatening and ‘off-putting’ for her to decide not to proceed with the 
loan: 
 
I don’t want to be locked into something that could change at somebody else’s whim, and 
being on a pension and getting paid fortnightly, 30 days is only two pays to me, so it’s only 
two pays’ notice. I just don’t like the idea of somebody being in that much control. I like to be 
in control myself.  
 
However, most other participants did not like the terms in the contract, but felt that their options were 
so limited that they made the decision to take the risk and proceed.  
 
Overall, these findings suggest that low income consumers may recognise potentially unfair terms in 
contracts, particularly when their attention is drawn to those terms specifically, or the terms are 
highlighted, rather than embedded in a long contract. However, even if they recognise a potential 
unfairness, the propensity of low income consumers to take action, or even to make enquiries, in 
relation to potential unfair terms or unjust contracts is likely to be limited. When combined with their 
limited understanding of consumer rights and remedies, this suggests that safety net provisions are 
likely to be of limited practical use to the group most likely to be in need of them.  
 
Discussion 
 
Consumer credit law in Australia is largely based on a ‘truth-in-lending’ model. Lenders have to 
disclose contract terms, to inform consumers and enable them to shop around, compare products and 
 21
select the most appropriate product. In this way, it is anticipated that disclosure will facilitate 
competition among credit providers. It is fundamental to this model that consumers behave in an 
economically rational way, with their own financial self-interest at heart. There is also an expectation 
that disclosure will ensure that consumers understand their rights and responsibilities. 
 
However, psychology and behavioural economic theory suggest that emotional and other imperatives 
often take over from economically rational behaviour. People are not driven solely by rationality, but 
are also influenced by a range of emotional forces, biases and choices that fall outside of their 
conscious awareness. (See for example the discussion in Howells 2005 and Willis 2008.) 
 
Qualitative research with 30 low income consumers in Melbourne, Victoria emphasises the limitations 
of a disclosure model of regulation. The research found that, for these participants, emotions were often 
more important than the economics of the transaction or the notion of an economically rational 
decision. These emotions included desperation for the money and the humiliation of admitting an 
inability to understand. For some; the contract was secondary to the emotional work of admitting they 
wanted something from another party. There was also the pragmatic realisation that for a person on a 
low-income, options in the market for credit were limited and therefore it was pointless to try to 
understand the contract. They realised that the choice to go elsewhere or negotiate did not exist for 
them. They simply needed to take what they could get.  
 
Participants demonstrated that the language and length of documents were also barriers to 
understanding contracts. In this sense, the disclosure regulatory regime discriminates against less 
uneducated and more vulnerable consumers.  
 
Borrowers’ capabilities were also important. Many admitted to just not having the literacy levels, 
experience in financial markets or access to advice to be able to understand the contract. As a result, 
they chose to take the risk and proceed with the hope that the lender would have their best interests at 
heart. In this connection, the Productivity Commission has recently recommended that disclosure be 
‘layered’ and that initially only key information, necessary to assist the consumer in making a decision 
as to whether or not to proceed, should be provided at the pre-contractual disclosure stage with 
additional information available by right on request. It has also recommended that documents should be 
tested with consumers (Productivity Commission 2008, p. 269). 
 
Overall, the study found that current pre-contractual disclosure documents (primarily the proposed 
contract) did not help participants to understand many of the important terms of the contract, or to 
know their rights. Instead, emotions and prejudices had a greater influence on their understanding of 
the contract terms, and their rights and responsibilities. 
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Participants’ comments generally contradicted the fundamental assumption of the UCCC that 
disclosure enables borrowers to make an informed choice about signing a credit contract. These 
participants suggest that disclosure alone is not adequate to protect vulnerable consumers.  
 
However, the UCCC is not only about disclosure. Provisions giving consumers rights to take legal 
action to challenge an unjust transaction, or an unconscionable fee or charge; and to seek a variation to 
their contract on the grounds of hardship, have also been included in the UCCC. It was anticipated that 
these provisions would operate as a safety net, giving vulnerable consumers redress in the event that 
disclosure and a competitive credit market does not prevent credit providers from engaging in unfair or 
inappropriate practices.  
 
The scope and application of these safety net provisions has been criticised on a number of grounds. 
While some of these concerns could be addressed by legislative amendment, a more fundamental 
criticism is that the safety net provisions rely on individual consumers to take action to activate the 
protections offered. There is no scope for regulators to institute proceedings on behalf of one or more 
affected consumers. This has particular impact on low income and vulnerable consumers, who face 
considerable practical and personal barriers to initiating legal action.  
 
The qualitative research described in this paper also indicates that these provisions may be of limited, if 
any, practical assistance to low income consumers. The research participants demonstrated difficulty in 
understanding their consumer rights. They were unaware of any specific rights provided under the 
UCCC, and were unsure who to approach to obtain advice.  
 
Many participants had not understood that the contract they signed gave the lender the right to vary 
terms and to accelerate the obligation to repay. Once they understood these rights they generally felt 
powerless and vulnerable. Even where they identified a contractual term as unfair or concerning, most 
participants were resigned to the contract being heavily weighted in favour of the credit provider, and 
gave no indication that they would challenge such a term in a future contract. Many participants were 
unable to advocate for themselves.  
 
It could be argued that competition between providers would reduce the incidence of unfair terms. 
However, participants of this project showed that their options were too limited to shop around for 
contracts with more appropriate terms. They also did not have the capacity to understand terms when 
they were embedded in a lengthy document, as is usually the case. In any case, in many sectors, all the 
relevant providers are likely to have very similar terms (Standing Committee on Law and Justice 2006, 
pp 13-14). 
 
The study highlights significant problems with the effectiveness, for low income consumers, of both 
the disclosure focus of the UCCC, and of the safety net provisions. Major changes need to be made if 
the UCCC is to be of any real benefit to low income consumers.  
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A more effective disclosure regime would require lenders to provide a summary or short-form contract 
in plain language. This would include details of repayment amounts, term, interest and fees. It would 
also highlight key terms, particularly those that have been identified by consumers or consumer 
advocates as potentially unfair terms. The summary document should include a simple explanation of 
consumers’ rights under the UCCC, for example their rights to approach the credit provider to vary the 
loan in the event of hardship or to apply to court to have contracts re-opened in the case of unjust 
transactions.  
 
Disclosure requirements should also be consumer-tested before regulations are finalised, and this 
should include testing by consumers on low incomes and with low levels of English and financial 
literacy. In this regard, we are pleased to note that the State and Territory governments have recently 
funded a project to test proposed changes to the disclosure requirements (see 
http://www.creditcode.gov.au/display.asp?file=/content/whatsnew.htm#streamlining).  
 
Disclosure requirements, however consumer friendly, are unlikely to ever be sufficient. The need for 
safety-net provisions in the UCCC remains, and they are particularly important for low income 
consumers. However, the effectiveness of these provisions has been limited, and this is due to both the 
scope of the provisions and the fact that they rely on consumer-initiated actions. A detailed review of 
the scope and application of the provisions is needed, and the impending transfer of responsibility for 
consumer credit regulation from the States and Territories to the Commonwealth Government provides 
the opportunity for such a review, albeit perhaps in phase two of the transfer process (Australian 
Government 2008, p. 3). At a bare minimum, the provisions should be amended to provide that the 
regulator can initiate proceedings to invoke the safety net provisions on behalf of one or more 
consumers. This is a critical change given the findings of consumers’ awareness of consumer rights, 
and the barriers to initiating legal action.  
 
The safety net regime should also be enhanced by the introduction of legislation to prohibit unfair 
terms in consumer contracts. Legislation to prohibit unfair terms in consumer contracts was introduced 
in the State of Victoria in 2004, but the provisions did not apply to consumer credit contracts (s 12, Fair 
Trading Amendment Act 2003 (Vic)). After some years of discussion, the Ministerial Council on 
Consumer Affairs has now agreed to implement an unfair contract terms regime nationally, to apply to 
all sectors of the economy (Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs 2008, pp 4-5).  
The experience of the United Kingdom since the introduction of the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 (UTCCR) suggests that such regulations can be very effective in 
improving the fairness (to the consumer) of terms in consumer contracts (eg, Bright 2000, p. 332; 
Ramsay 2007, p. 211). Particularly relevant for low income consumers, Bright has noted the likely 
positive impact of the regulations on credit contracts in the ‘non-status’ (or ‘fringe’) market, ‘in which 
terms are more commonly unfair’ (Bright 1999, p. 364). 
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The effectiveness of the UTCCR in protecting consumers, and particularly low income consumers, 
from unfair terms in credit contracts in particular is due in part to the scope of the regulations, with 
their wide remit, and detailed examples. However, given the considerable barriers to consumer 
litigation discussed above, it is apparent that a major factor in the success of the UTCCR for consumers 
across many sectors of the economy is the fact that the OFT has been resourced to take action, and has 
used those resources in a very proactive manner, including by systemic reviews of contracts in 
particular sectors, and by reviewing entire contracts, even though a complaint might refer only to one 
term in a contract (eg, Bright 2000, pp 333-334). As Bright notes: 
It is this energetic administrative action which will lead to a reshaping of mortgage contracts, 
and the judgments in Falco Finance and Kindlance v Murphy provide the necessary legal 
underpinning to support this approach (Bright 1999, p. 365). 
 
Australia’s implementation of an unfair contract terms regime must similarly be accompanied by 
appropriate resourcing of the regulator(s).  
 
More recently, the UK has introduced new provisions dealing with unfair consumer credit relationships 
(ss 140A - C Consumer Credit Act 1974 (UK)). These provisions were introduced following concerns 
that the then existing protections against extortionate credit bargains were not operating effectively 
(Department of Trade and Industry 2003, p 52). The introduction of these provisions suggests that a 
prohibition against unfair terms in consumer contracts is not, by itself, sufficient to protect vulnerable 
consumers from unfair or unconscionable practices in the consumer credit market. Although Australia 
does not have provisions dealing with unfair credit relationships, it does prohibit unconscionable 
conduct (eg ss 12CA and CB, Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)). 
Such provisions can complement, rather than replace the need for, prohibitions against unfair terms, 
and can enhance the protections for vulnerable consumers. 
Conclusion 
  
Our research shows that the current provisions of the UCCC are not effective in enabling low income 
consumers to make informed decisions about consumer credit. Nor are they effective in protecting low 
income consumers from unfair or inappropriate creditor practices, or facilitating changes to a credit 
contract in circumstances of financial hardship. Significant changes are needed to the regulatory 
framework, including changes to the use and format of disclosure documents, changes to give 
government consumer agencies standing to conduct UCCC proceedings on behalf of consumers, and 
the introduction of an unfair contract terms regime. A number of these regulatory changes suggested 
above have been agreed to in principle by the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments, and 
these commitments must be given full effect in the forthcoming transfer of credit regulation to the 
Commonwealth. Further, phase two of the transfer should incorporate a broader review of the safety 
net provisions in particular. 
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In relation to the New Zealand credit legislation, Anae and Coxon have concluded that:  
 
The Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act may work as intended for consumers 
borrowing from ‘mainstream’ financial institutions. There is clear evidence, however, that the 
Act does not provide sufficient protection to credit consumers dependent on ‘fringe’ lenders 
(Anae and Coxon 2007, p. 107). 
 
Our research suggests that this conclusion is equally apt for the Australian UCCC. To enable all 
Australians to make effective and appropriate use of credit facilities to enhance their daily lives, it is 
essential that measures in the UCCC to protect vulnerable and low-income consumers are strengthened. 
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Annexure 1 
Discussion guide: views on disclosure 
 
1. How did you go with the paperwork? What did you think of it? Was it much different to 
other forms you’ve completed? 
 
2. Are you interested in what your fortnightly repayment is? (If they don’t give the specific 
repayment rate, prompt: ‘what do you think the repayment rate is?’) 
 
3. What do you think about the length of time it will take you to repay the loan? (If they are 
not specific about the term, prompt: ‘how long do you think it will take?’) 
 
4. What do you think about the cost of the loan? (If they don’t mention interest, prompt – 
‘what do you think about the interest rate’? If they are not specific, ask ‘what do you think the 
interest rate is?’) Apart from the interest payments, are there any other costs to the loan? What 
do you think they are? Do you know what the loan is costing you in total?  
 
5. Did you realise that you are breaking this contract if you use the money loaned to you for 
something different to what is set out in this letter? What else do you think might be breaking 
this contract? (Once they answer – ‘what do you think would happen if you …. [their 
answer]?’) 
 
6. Did you realise you have the right to make a complaint if the Bank [or co-operative] makes 
a mistake? What other rights do you think you might have? 
 
7. If you had any problems in making payments, who would you discuss this with? 
 
8. What is the most important thing you have learnt from this paperwork? 
 
9. What don’t you like about the paperwork?  
 
10. If you had a choice between this contract (point to summarised version of contract) and 
the one you’ve just signed, which would you prefer? Why? 
 
11. How much of the paperwork did you read?  
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Annexure 2 
Short Form Personal Loan Contract  
 
1. You are borrowing $ ……… to be advanced on ………. 
 
2. You are being charged an annual interest rate of …..%, calculated each day, but payable as 
part of your fortnightly repayment of $.............. 
 
3. You will pay a loan approval fee of $..... 
 
4. The terms of this loan may be varied by the lender without your consent. 
 
5. If you fail to make a payment when it falls due, the lender will give you 30 days to pay and 
will then be entitled to demand repayment of the full loan amount. 
 
6. You will receive a statement from the lender every 6 months and will need to pay between 
$3 and $14 for an additional statement should you require it. 
 
 
Note that loan size, date, interest rate, fortnightly repayment rate and application fee 
completed by hand at the interview.
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Annexure 3 
Discussion guide: unfair contract terms 
 
1. What did you think of the papers and the way [company name] does things? 
 
2. What did you like about the way they do things? 
 
3. Was there anything you didn’t like? [prompt: in the paperwork or in the process.] Was 
there anything you found difficult to understand? [If yes, prompt: Did you do or say anything 
about this?] 
 
Here is a pretend contract. It includes some sentences which might be similar to the one you 
signed with [insert name of company they obtained finance from.] We’re interested in what 
you think about this pretend contract and if you can remember, how you felt when you signed 
up with [company name]. 
 
4. Let’s have a look at number 1 on this contract. It’s likely that you had a similar clause in 
your contract with [company name]. What do you think of this? [Prompts: how would you 
have felt if [company name] changed the repayment rate without your okay? How would you 
feel if they changed the interest rate? Did you realise they could do that?] 
 
5. Let’s think about number 2 on the contract. What are your views on this? [Prompts: if 
[company name] asked you to repay the entire loan in one lump sum, how would you have 
felt? Did you realise they could do that?]  
 
6. Let’s have a look at number 3 on the contract. What do you think of this? [Prompts: How 
would you have felt if [company name] were able to take household goods like your bed or 
kitchen utensils if you didn’t repay the loan? Did you realise they could do that?] 
 
7. Did you have any disagreement about the loan with [company name]? [If so, tell me a bit 
about what happened (try to get who they spoke to, and why). If not, who would you discuss 
any difficulties with? (Try to get information on why they would go to this person).] Do you 
think you have any legal rights in working out any disagreements about the loan? Can you tell 
me a bit about what these rights might be? 
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Annexure 4 
Mock unfair credit contract  
 
Credit Contract 
 
Between: Credit provider (“we”) 
And: Borrower (“you”) 
 
1. From time to time we may: 
a. change the amount of or basis for calculating any fee or charge, change the interest or fee 
charging cycle, or both, and, except during any fixed interest rate period of the Loan, change 
any interest rate margin, any link to a reference interest rate and the basis for calculating 
interest; 
b. impose and debit to the Loan Account any new fee or charge; 
c. change the frequency of repayments; 
d. change the Loan Account number; 
e. change the way we describe any reference interest rate; and 
f. change any other terms and conditions. 
 
2. In the event of default we may terminate this agreement, require payment of all monies 
then due and owing under this agreement, and exercise our rights over security property 
provided by you in accordance with clause 13. 
 
3. As continuing security for the payment of all of your debts, liabilities and obligations to us, 
you grant a security interest to and in favour of us over all of your present or after acquired 
personal property and proceeds there from.  
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